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Objectives: Half of US states have minimum cigarette price laws that were originally passed to protect
small independent retailers from unfair price competition with larger retailers. These laws prohibit
cigarettes from being sold below a minimum price that is set by a formula. Many of these laws allow
cigarette company promotional incentives offered to retailers, such as buydowns and master-type
programmes, to be calculated into the formula. Allowing this provision has the potential to lower the
allowable minimum price. This study assesses whether stores in states with minimum price laws have
higher cigarette prices and lower rates of retailer participation in cigarette company promotional incentive
programmes.
Design: Retail cigarette prices and retailer participation in cigarette company incentive programmes in
2001 were compared in eight states with minimum price laws and seven states without them. New York
State had the most stringent minimum price law at the time of the study because it excluded promotional
incentive programmes in its price setting formula; cigarette prices in New York were compared to all other
states included in the study.
Results: Cigarette prices were not significantly different in our sample of US states with and without
cigarette minimum price laws. Cigarette prices were significantly higher in New York stores than in the 14
other states combined.
Conclusions: Most existing minimum cigarette price laws appear to have little impact on the retail price of
cigarettes. This may be because they allow the use of promotional programmes, which are used by
manufacturers to reduce cigarette prices. New York’s strategy to disallow these types of incentive
programmes may result in higher minimum cigarette prices, and should also be explored as a potential
policy strategy to control cigarette company marketing practices in stores. Strict cigarette minimum price
laws may have the potential to reduce cigarette consumption by decreasing demand through increased
cigarette prices and reduced promotional activities at retail outlets.
C
igarette companies use price discounts and promotional
allowances extensively to stimulate product sales in
stores. These account for 88% of the record $12.5 billion
spent by cigarette companies to market their products in
2002,1 and include a variety of incentives offered by cigarette
companies to retailers to promote product sales and enable
cigarette companies to exert control over advertising and the
placement and pricing of their products in stores.2–4 Cigarette
prices can be manipulated by the cigarette companies with
price discounts through buydowns (or rebates), which are
‘‘cents off’’ sales on existing inventory for limited time
periods, and through price discounts on volume orders that
are often packaged in master-type contracts such as the
Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program.1
A large body of evidence shows that increased cigarette
prices lead to reduced cigarette consumption.5 A study of
industry documents reveals that cigarette companies often
responded to state cigarette tax increases and other tobacco
control efforts by discounting cigarette prices.6 Thus, promo-
tional incentives, such as buydowns and master-type
programmes, are important tools that tobacco companies
can employ to negate the loss of sales and subsequent
decreases in cigarette consumption that can result from these
tobacco control policy initiatives.
Policies that restrict the use of these types of promotional
incentives may be one mechanism to protect the public
health impact of higher cigarette prices. In the USA, 25 states
have minimum purchase price laws that apply to cigarette
sales.7 These laws are best understood as a special type of
unfair competition law. Most, if not all, of these minimum
price laws originated between the 1940s and ’60s, and were
designed to eliminate the cigarette companies’ use of
predatory and/or discriminatory business practices, such as
loss leader marketing and discriminatory promotions. For
instance, a wholesaler might give one store owner favourable
terms, but deny them to other store owners. These laws
appear to be designed mainly to protect cigarette sellers with
higher costs of doing business (for example, small, indepen-
dently owned stores) from price competition from larger
retailers with lower overhead (for example, chains, large
discount stores).7 Thus, minimum price laws arose to protect
business not public health. Nevertheless, one report esti-
mated that the application of minimum price laws may
reduce cigarette consumption by 2–3% because of higher
prices.7
Minimum price laws contain formulas that specify whole-
sale and retail markups in calculation of the minimum price
of cigarettes (fig 1). Typically, the wholesaler’s price is
calculated as the manufacturer’s list price plus the state
excise tax plus the wholesaler’s cost of doing business
(usually between 2–6%.) Then, the retailer’s price is
calculated as the wholesaler’s price minus trade discounts
plus the retailer’s cost of doing business (usually between
5–10%, except for Massachusetts where it is 25%). Each
business has the option to show that its cost of doing
business is lower than the statutory presumption.7
If wholesale and retail markups were similar across states,
one might expect higher retail cigarette prices in states with
minimum price laws than in states without minimum price
laws (assuming both groups of states have identical state
80
www.tobaccocontrol.com
excise taxes). However, nearly all of these minimum price
laws allow promotional incentives, such as buydowns and
master-type programmes, to be subtracted as trade discounts
from the wholesale price before applying the retailer markup.
This practice has the effect of lowering the minimum
cigarette price. At the time of study, New York was the only
state that did not allow these types of promotional incentives
to be deducted as trade discounts in the calculation of the
minimum price.8 Research is needed to understand whether
minimum price laws successfully raise cigarette retail prices,
or whether their potential impact is undermined through
promotional incentive programmes such as buydowns and
master-type programmes. The purpose of this paper is to
compare the retail price of premium cigarettes in a sample of
states with and without minimum price laws. Additionally,
since retail prices are also affected by promotional incentives,
we also compare retailer incentive programme participation
rates in states with and without these minimum price laws.
METHODS
To study the relationship between minimum price laws, retail
cigarette prices, and receipt of trade discounts, data were
drawn from two sources: (1) an examination of minimum
price laws developed for an exploratory policy analysis
funded by the California Department of Health Services
Tobacco Control Section; and (2) data from a national study
funded by the National Cancer Institute as part of its
initiative on State and Community Interventions. The
ancillary study presented here used two datasets from the
national study: the compliance check dataset, to determine the
prices of two premium cigarette brands; and the retail incentive
interview dataset, to identify types and amount of incentives
that retailers receive from cigarette companies. The methods
employed in the national study are described elsewhere.4
Sample
The initial sample of stores for the national study was
selected using a stratified multistage clustered design to
obtain a nationally representative sample of cigarette retail
outlets in the continental US in communities with popula-
tions of at least 25 000 persons. Approximately 1500 retail
outlets in 75 communities in 15 states were included in the
study. The first stage sampling units were states, the second
stage units were communities, and the third stage units were
cigarette retail outlets. Thus stores were clustered within
communities, which were clustered within states. For the
present study we focused on approximately 1500 stores
within 15 states. The number of stores per state ranged from
41–231.
Price of cigarettes
On a randomly rotating basis, the price of a single pack of
Marlboro or Newport cigarettes was obtained in the course of
compliance checks in 1547 stores in the summer of 2001.
Active parental consent was obtained for the youth who
participated in the study in accordance with Institutional
Review Board policies and procedures of the Battelle Centers
for Public Health Research and Evaluation. Marlboro and
Newport were selected for use in the national compliance
check study because they are the leading brands smoked by
youth.9 The mean state cigarette excise tax amount in states
with a minimum price law was $0.77, and was $0.53 in states
without a law. Therefore, the current study used cigarette
prices excluding sales tax and state excise tax. In the states
with a minimum price law, the state excise tax amount to be
removed was adjusted for wholesale and retail markups. As
there was variation in the wholesale and retail percentage
markups, we used the midpoint value of the range of markup
percentages in our computation of price. Thus to remove the
full effect of state excise tax when a minimum price law
existed, the base state excise tax amount was first increased
by 4% to adjust for wholesaler markups (the midpoint
between 2% and 6%), and the resulting amount by an
additional 7.5% (the midpoint between 5% and 10%) to
account for retailer markups, with the exception of
Massachusetts which had a 25% retailer markup. The final
adjusted amount for state excise tax was then subtracted
from the retail price without sales tax to yield the price of a
pack of cigarettes with sales and state excise tax removed.
The adjustment for markups was not made in states without
a minimum price law, as prices in these states were naturally
occurring, and not subject to price formulas for state excise
tax that incorporated wholesale and retail markups.
Incentive participation
In autumn 2001, stores with completed compliance checks
were contacted and 524 retailers completed a telephone
interview about participation in cigarette company incentive
programmes, such as promotional allowances and buydowns.
A verbal consent script approved by the IRB was read to
retailers and consent was granted before commencing the
interview. Merchants received a $20 money order as
compensation for completing the 10–20 minute interview.
As part of the retailer interview, respondents answered
questions regarding cigarette company incentives and con-
tractual programmes. Separate questions asked whether the
store currently received any buydowns or had a contract with
any tobacco manufacturers. The overall completion rate for
Manufacturer's gross invoice price (excluding manufacturer's
discounts for timely payment and stamping)
+
=
x% of gross invoice cost to retailer or retailer's actual cost
of doing business
=
x% mark-up or wholesaler's actual cost
of doing business
+
x% mark-up or actual cartage costs,










Figure 1 Calculation of minimum cigarette sale prices. Adapted from:
Michael J. The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act. St Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota
House of Representatives, Research Department, September 2000.
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the interviews was 33.5%. By state, completion rates ranged
from 21.8–50.8%.
Minimum price laws
Eight of the 15 states in the national study were found
to have minimum price laws (Delaware, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin), according to a report on minimum price
laws developed by the Research Department of the
Minnesota House of Representatives.7 In summer 2002, legal
researchers at the Technical Assistance Legal Center at the
Public Health Institute then reviewed the minimum price
laws in these eight states (DE State Code, Title 6, Chapter 26,
Sections 2601–2608; KY Revised Statutes, Chapter 365.260–
365.380; General Laws of MA, Chapter 93, Sections 14E–14K
and Chapter 64C, Sections 13–21; NE State Code, Sections
59–1501 to 59–1518; NY State Consolidated Laws, Tax, Article
20-A, Sections 483–489; OH Revised Code, Title 13, Sections
1333.11–1333.21; PA State Code, Title 72, Sections 202-A to
230-A; and WI Statutes, Chapter 100, Section 30). Key
provisions were compared including: history of the law,
exclusions, formulas for calculating minimum price, mini-
mum wholesaler and retailer markups, penalties for non-
compliance, and the enforcing agency.
To assess the representativeness of our sample of states, we
used 2000 US Census data to compare the eight study states
with a minimum price law to the 17 non-study states with a
minimum price law. Similar comparisons were made for
states without a minimum price law. Statistical tests were
conducted on 17 Census variables assessing state level
sociodemographic characteristics (for example, age, sex,
racial/ethnic composition, household/family composition,
education, and income/poverty). Out of a total of 34 tests
conducted, none of these were significant at the 0.01 level.
We used the more stringent p value of 0.01 because of the
number of tests performed.
Analysis
Descriptive statistics were computed for price of cigarette by
brand, and for retailer participation in two types of cigarette
company incentive programmes: buydowns and master-type
volume discount programmes (referenced as contracts in this
study) stratified by whether the state had a minimum price
law.
We sought to determine whether state minimum price
laws were related to the price of a pack of cigarettes and
incentive participation rates. Because of the nested nature of
the data, tests for differences in price and participation rates
in incentive programmes between states with and without
minimum price laws required a multilevel modelling
approach. A total of four multilevel models were generated:
separate models for price of Marlboro and Newport, and for
participation in buydowns and contracts.
The multilevel models can be conceptualised as having two
levels: stores at level 1, and states at level 2. The outcome
measures were price of a single pack of cigarettes and
participation in incentive programmes, both level 1 variables.
There were no level 1 predictors, however the level 1 intercept
was allowed to randomly vary across states. At level 2 the sole
predictor was whether or not the state had a minimum price
law. Thus level 1 intercepts, or state averages, were predicted
by state minimum price law status. The primary interest of
the model was the cross level relation between state
minimum price law and the level 1 intercept. The level 2
intercept represented the estimated average price of a pack of
cigarettes in states without a minimum price law, and the
regression coefficient for state minimum price law status
represented the difference in price for states with a law
versus those without a law. The level 2 coefficient in the
incentive models represented the difference in mean parti-
cipation rates across states. All associated tests of statistical
significance were two tailed. As stated previously, in states
with a minimum price law, the state excise tax amount
removed from the retail price was adjusted for wholesale and
retail markups. Although not presented in tables, additional
models were run using adjusted price values computed with
the minimum and maximum wholesale and retail markup
values.
To assess whether the prices and retailer participation in
incentives of New York stores were different from stores in
the other states, independent sample two tailed t tests and
simple logistic regression models were generated.
Descriptive statistics and store level analyses were per-
formed using SPSS 10.0 for Windows. Multilevel modelling
analysis was performed using HLM5.05.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the prices of two
premium cigarette brands in our sample of stores. The
observed price of Marlboro was virtually equal in states with
and without a minimum price law, in New York the price was
13 cents higher. The price of Newport was 9 cents lower in
states with a minimum price law than in states without a
law, in New York the price was 8 cents higher. For each of
these prices, the state excise tax has been removed.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for retailer participa-
tion in cigarette company incentive programmes. Of the
stores in states without a minimum price law, 66% received
buydowns compared to 55% of stores in states with a
minimum price law, and in New York 41% of stores received
buydowns. Participation in master contracts followed a
similar pattern with 61% of stores in states without laws
participating, 49% of stores in states with a minimum price
law, and 38% of stores in New York.
Table 3 displays four multilevel models with price of
Marlboro and Newport as the outcome in the first two
models, and buydown and contract participation as the
outcomes in the third and fourth models. In all multilevel
models, the variance estimates for the level 1 intercepts
significantly differed from zero, indicating the existence of
random variation in the outcomes across states. The
estimated mean price for Marlboro in a state without a
minimum price law was $3.02 and for Newport was $3.08,
which did not differ significantly from prices for these brands
in states with a minimum price law (p = 0.96 for Marlboro
and p = 0.34 for Newport). For states without a minimum
price law, 67% of stores participated in buydowns, and 60%
had contracts, which did not differ significantly from states
with a minimum price law (p = 0.06 in buydowns and
p = 0.17 in contracts). These models were replicated using
adjusted price values computed with minimum and max-
imum wholesale and retail markups (data not presented).
The conclusions from the models with price computation
using minimum and maximum values for markups did not
differ from those presented in table 3, which used markup
midpoints for price computations.
Prices for both Marlboro and Newport were significantly
higher in New York stores compared to all other stores
(t values: 23.18 and 23.28 for Marlboro and Newport,
respectively, p , 0.00) (data not presented). Using simple
logistic regression, the odds of participation in buydowns was
significantly lower in New York stores compared to all other
stores (odds ratio 0.42, p = 0.031). However, no significant
difference was found in contract participation.
DISCUSSION
The findings from this study indicate that cigarette prices
with excise taxes removed do not differ in states with and
82 Feighery, Ribisl, Schleicher, et al
www.tobaccocontrol.com
without minimum price laws. Prices may not be higher in
minimum price states because nearly all of the minimum
price laws allow promotional incentives such as buydowns
and master-type programmes to be deducted as trade
discounts in formulas for establishing the minimum cigarette
price. In New York, the one state at the time of the study that
did not allow these types of promotional incentives to be
factored into its formula, cigarette prices were significantly
higher. The New York results should be viewed with some
caution though because the number of New York stores
participating in the study was small and other factors such as
cost of living may be contributing to higher prices (even
though sales and state and local excise taxes were removed).
There were no significant differences in retailer participa-
tion in promotional incentive programmes in states with
minimum price laws, with the exception of New York where
retailers were significantly less likely to participate in
buydowns; however, their participation in contracts such as
master-type programmes was not significantly different from
retailers in other states. Of note, about 40% of the New York
retailers reported participation in both types of promotional
incentive programmes, which may indicate a lack of
compliance with the state law.
Aside from potentially increasing cigarette prices, strict
minimum cigarette price laws that also ban promotional
allowances may have the added effect of reducing the
amount of in-store cigarette advertising. Stores participating
in buydowns and master type programmes display signifi-
cantly more cigarette advertising than non-participating
stores.4 A Philip Morris document indicates that the company
is well aware of the implications that minimum price laws
will affect point-of-sale advertising.10 Keeler and colleagues
found that increases in tobacco advertising following the
Master Settlement Agreement may have dampened the
magnitude of decreases in cigarette consumption that were
expected.11 It is likely that minimum price laws that eliminate
promotional incentives to retailers will reduce the amount of
retail cigarette advertising associated with these price
reduction strategies.
There are political challenges to strengthening minimum
prices laws and efforts to do so in two states have been
contentious. After the state of New York adopted regulations
that prohibited the use of promotional allowances including
buydowns,8 Lorillard Tobacco Company sued the state in
2001. The Court of Appeals of New York subsequently upheld
a lower court ruling in the state’s favour, declaring that the
application of the state law to such programmes was
permissible.12 13 In 2002, the Massachusetts Department of
Revenue attempted to eliminate the use of cigarette retail
promotional allowances, including buydowns, claiming that
these violated the terms of the state’s fair pricing law.14 In
response to a strong lobbying effort by retailers and merchant
associations, the Department of Revenue rescinded the
regulations7 15 but subsequently adopted and initiated enfor-
cement of the more stringent regulations starting 1 October
2003.16 17 Because our data were collected before adoption of
these more restrictive regulations, their impact on cigarette
prices is not known.
Half the states in the USA with minimum price laws in
effect have the opportunity to restrict cigarette company
promotional incentive programmes by strengthening their
current minimum cigarette price laws to be more akin to
those in New York or Massachusetts. The other half of the
states with no minimum price laws could enact such laws.
Although substantial political opposition may come from
cigarette manufacturers, wholesalers, retailer associations,
and chambers of commerce, the experiences in these two
states suggest that it is possible to strengthen regulations to
prohibit manufacturer promotional programmes.
Given the limitations on the regulation of cigarette
advertising, minimum price laws may be one of the few
vehicles available to accomplish reductions in cigarette
advertising at the point of sale. There is a risk that newly
adopted minimum price laws or strengthened versions of
existing laws could be challenged as pre-empted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA),
although this has not been raised as an issue in New York or
Massachusetts. The FCLAA is a federal law that prohibits any
state or local law limiting cigarette ‘‘advertising or promo-
tion’’ if such a law is ‘‘based on smoking and health’’.18 If a
state minimum price law is challenged, a court would only
find the law pre-empted if it intruded on both elements of the
FCLAA—that is, (1) the state law regulates ‘‘advertising or
promotion’’ and (2) the state law is ‘‘based on smoking and
health’’.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the price of one pack of cigarettes (sales and excise
taxes removed) by presence of state minimum price law (data collected June–October
2001)
State’s status with respect
to minimum price law* n
US$
mean SD Minimum Maximum
Marlboro
No 348 3.05 0.40 1.90 4.12
Yes 277 3.04 0.37 2.01 3.80
New York 60 3.18 0.33 2.01 3.76
Newport
No 339 3.12 0.40 2.03 4.12
Yes 284 3.03 0.36 1.86 4.14
New York 58 3.20 0.28 2.41 3.76
*Seven states do not have minimum price law and eight states have minimum price law. New York has the most
stringent minimum price law, and it is included in the ‘‘yes’’ group.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for retailer incentive
participation by presence of state minimum price law
(data collected June–October 2001)
State’s status with respect
to minimum price law* n % participate SD
Buydown
No 224 0.66 0.47
Yes 205 0.55 0.50
New York 27 0.41 0.50
Contract
No 203 0.61 0.49
Yes 188 0.49 0.50
New York 26 0.38 0.50
*Seven states do not have minimum price laws and eight states have
minimum price laws. New York has the most stringent minimum price
law, and it is included in the ‘‘yes’’ group.
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As to the first element, state laws that merely set a
minimum price for cigarettes and do not directly limit
cigarette marketing practices, such as buydowns, should not
be pre-empted by the federal law because they do not
regulate ‘‘advertising or promotion’’, only the price of
cigarettes. Regarding the second element of the federal law,
even if a minimum price law is deemed to regulate cigarette
‘‘advertising or promotion’’, the law still would not be pre-
empted by the FCLAA unless it is also found by a court to be
‘‘based on smoking and health’’. Laws that merely set a
minimum price in order to reduce unfair competition (as
nearly all of the existing laws are designed to do) should not
be found to be ‘‘based on smoking and health’’. Nevertheless,
the law in this area is still developing. No court has addressed
minimum price laws in the context of federal pre-emption or
whether a minimum price law that effectively prohibits
‘‘buydowns’’ could be considered a regulation of cigarette
‘‘promotions’’ under the FCLAA. Advocates are encouraged to
consult an expert in tobacco legal issues before drafting a
new law.
There are several limitations to this study. While the
cigarette price data were collected from a nationally
representative sample of stores in the continental US from
communities with populations of at least 25 000 persons, the
sample of stores that participated in a survey about cigarette
company incentive programmes was much smaller because
of a relatively low response rate. Also, we did not assess
compliance with the minimum price laws by comparing the
published minimum price in each state against the prices that
we observed. Our approach to removing the ‘‘effect’’ of state
excise taxes when a minimum price law existed included the
use of estimated values for wholesale and retail markups.
Moreover, a constant markup value was applied across all
stores and states, with the exception of Massachusetts for
which a different but constant within state retail markup
value was used. In reality, wholesale and retail markup
values vary, and such variation would change the price of
cigarettes. However, obtaining actual wholesale and retail
markups was beyond the scope of the current study. It is
noteworthy that the same conclusions are made with models
using price computed with minimum and maximum markup
values. Future studies of these types of laws should sample
all states in the USA and price data should be collected on
more than two brands to further examine price differences in
states with and without minimum price laws. Further
investigation into compliance with minimum price laws is
also warranted.
Thus far, we have described some of the benefits and
drawbacks of a minimum price strategy. Raising cigarette
excise taxes is another policy strategy that can affect cigarette
prices and numerous studies confirm that higher taxes
reduce smoking.19–21 Given the budget shortfalls that faced
state governments from 2002 to 2004, it was not surprising
that over 30 states raised their cigarette excise tax during this
period.22 However, this flurry of activity is unlikely to be
repeated if the economy rebounds.
We are not certain whether it is easier or more difficult to
implement changes to minimum price laws than raising
excise taxes through state legislatures. However, we believe
that these two strategies each have strengths and weak-
nesses. Minimum price laws are based on percentage
Table 3 Multilevel models with price in US$ and incentive participation as outcomes and
state minimum price law category as level 2 predictor
Coefficient SE p Value
Cigarette price, $
Marlboro
Intercept, level 2 3.02 0.05 0.000
Predictor: state has a law 0.00 0.07 0.960
Sample size: level 1 n = 625, level 2 n = 15
Newport
3.08Intercept, level 2 0.05 0.000
Predictor: state has a law 20.07 0.07 0.341
Sample size: level 1 n = 623, level 2 n = 15
Incentive participation, proportion
Buydown
Intercept, level 2 0.67 0.04 0.000
Predictor: state has a law 20.12 0.06 0.064
Sample size: level 1 n = 429, level 2 n = 15
Contract
Intercept, level 2 0.60 0.06 0.000
Predictor: state has a law 20.11 0.08 0.167
Sample size: level 1 n = 483, level 2 n = 15
What this paper adds
Minimum cigarette price laws were originally passed to
protect small independent retailers from predatory pricing
strategies of large corporate competitors. Half of US states
currently have these laws, which set minimum cigarette prices
by applying a predetermined formula to the manufacturer’s
invoice price for cigarettes. There is speculation that cigarette
prices are higher in states with these minimum price laws,
which could potentially improve public health by leading to
reduced cigarette consumption. Currently, there are no
studies comparing cigarette prices in states with and without
this type of law.
This study compared retail cigarette prices in 15 states and
found no difference in cigarette prices based on whether or
not the state had a minimum price law. This lack of difference
in price may be attributable to the fact that most existing
minimum price laws allow cigarette companies to artificially
lower the invoice price by permitting them to deduct price
discounts given to retailers that are part of promotional
incentive programmes. However, one of the eight states with
a minimum price law in this study did not allow this practice
and cigarette prices were significantly higher in this state.
This suggests that these policies may have the potential to
lead to higher cigarette prices and lower cigarette consump-
tion.
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markups on wholesale prices, so minimum prices will rise as
the manufacturer’s list price rises over time. In contrast,
excise taxes are generally a predetermined amount (for
example, $1.00 per pack of 20 cigarettes) and lose their value
over time as inflation occurs. On the other hand, excise taxes
generate revenue and many legislatures have earmarked
these funds for state tobacco control programmes, public
health programmes, and the general fund. In contrast, when
prices are raised through minimum price laws, either the
wholesaler or the retailer gets to keep the increased amount.
In other words, tobacco sellers benefit rather than state
governments and public health programmes.
Tax increases are often passed on to consumers, but Keeler
and colleagues also found that retail prices can be lowered in
response to state and local tobacco control laws.23 Keeler’s
findings are consistent with those found in tobacco industry
documents6 where the use of promotional incentives for these
purposes was also confirmed. Further, Chaloupka and
colleagues concluded that future tobacco control efforts
should attempt to both raise prices and limit price related
marketing strategies. It would appear then that excise tax
increases coupled with strict minimum price laws would have
the greatest impact on increasing cigarette prices and
reducing cigarette consumption.
Some caution is warranted because broad adoption of more
stringent minimum price laws may unintentionally stimulate
the use of alternative sources of cigarette purchases. For
example, retailers and tobacco industry representatives in
Massachusetts claimed that smokers attempted to purchase
cigarettes across the state border and via the internet when
the state started enforcing its minimum price law.17 Recent
evidence from New Jersey shows that more smokers turned
to purchasing cigarettes on the internet after that state
increased its state cigarette excise tax to the highest in the
country.24 It is also possible that manufacturers could make
across-the-board cuts in the invoice price if minimum price
laws eliminated all price reductions at the retail level.
However, manufacturers might hesitate to do this because
they would lose control of how their products are marketed
on store shelves.25 Politically, many state legislatures may
lack the will to stave off the considerable pressure from
cigarette companies and retailers.
Nevertheless, we believe that minimum cigarette price laws
warrant further examination because they may provide one
of the few vehicles available to place limits on both tobacco
industry advertising and pricing practices in the retail outlet.
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